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THE PROBLEMS OF LIQUIDITY  







After implementation of antiinflationary measures in October 1993, the 
question  of  liquidity  in  the  Croatian  economy  has  been slowly 
becoming one of the main topics of discussions. The statement that 
"liquidity  of  the economy is essentially threatened", that "monetary 
policy is too restrictive" and that continuation of the started policy will 
imperil  the stabilization program, was very often heard in weeks 
following the implementation of the program. Enterprises (especially 
those state-owned) emphasize, that it is just "additional liquidity" they 
need to  increase significantly their production. A very low share of 
money supply in GDP, non-functioning of the payment system and 
general economic collapse, have also  been  mentioned  as arguments. 
A critique of exchange rate policy is still present nowadays, six month 
after the implementation of the program. All these arguments have one 
objective in its essence. They suggest the possibility of one simple 
"medical treatment" of the current unfavorable conditions. According to 
those beliefs, it is just necessary to "loosen" the monetary anchor, to 
"print more money", namely to improve liquidity of banks and the whole 
economy in this way.  All  that  would improve "non-stimulating" 
exchange rate, payments would return into normal flows, production 
would increase,  and economy  would be on the best way of recovery 
and on the paths of high growth. If only that would be possible! The 
purpose of this paper is the review of macroeconomic views of the 
problems of liquidity in Croatia. It represents the comprehension of that 
question from the aspect of monetary authority. Therefore, the close 




1. The economic policy objectives and monetary policy  
2. The concept of liquidity, the methods of its 
measurement and possible sources of lack of liquidity  
3. Monetary policy and restrictions in its implementation 
4. Further course of action and possible measures to alleviate the 
problem. 
 
The source of  data  in  text if not differently quoted is the Bulletin of 
NBH, NBC Main Statistical Indicators and data bases of the National 




1. The economic policy objectives and monetary policy 
 
1.1. THE ECONOMIC POLICY OBJECTIVES 
 
The starting premise of the paper is that in a short run the basic 
objective of the economic policy in Croatia is the maintenance of 
very low inflation. Under low inflation, we should consider yearly rates 
of  price  growth  which  do not overrun 20 percents.1 Low inflation 
should be  considered  as  the indispensable presumption of all 
economic reforms. According to available economic indicators, the first 
phase  of stabilization  program has successfully come to its end. 
Already for two months continually, inflation has been low. After the 
increase of 1.4% in November, - 0.5% in December confirm the 
effectiveness  of antiinflationary measures carried out by the 
Government of the National Bank of Croatia. Anyway, it shouldn't be 
forgotten that  this  is a very delicate, initial phase of stabilization 
program implementation. The credibility of the program has been 
significantly reinforced by cutting down inflation, but that credibility is 
surely  still  inclined  to  changes. In  the  case  of  the least indications of 
                                                          
1 In developed countries by low inflation is considered that one which is under 
4% yearly. For the countries in transition, the low two-digit rates of price growth 
could be considered as acceptable. 
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economic (and especially monetary) policy changes, the return of 
inflationary  expectations  which  are still deep-rooted in the conscience 
of economic subjects can quickly appear. 
 
Along with inflation, a policy of Croatian dinar rate gets big significance 
within that frame. With application of the program, a new way of 
formation of  exchange rate has been implemented (see Škreb, 1993). 
As the 16 percents appreciation of dinar rate (in relation to rate of 4444 
HRD2 for DEM at the beginning of October - see figure No. 1) 
significantly contributed  to "blowing out"  of the inflationary balloon, a 
fast rate of depreciation could quickly return inflation again as the 
problem number one. 
 
 
                                                          
2 HRD is an acronym for temporary domestic currency Croatian Dinar. 
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Consequently, it is indispensable that the National Bank goes on 
conducting the policy of intervention at foreign exchange market, 
which would keep the rate at the current level. Devaluation would be 
equal to the  destruction  of program. It  is indispensable to insist on a 
fact that a market should  be  balanced  by  lowering down the prices, 
and not by administrative rising of the exchange rate. 
 
 
1.2. THE REALIZATION OF RESTRICTIVE MONETARY POLICY 
 
The continuation  of  restrictive  monetary  policy is necessary because 
of several reasons. First, it is a constraint of inflationary tendencies 
and all negative consequences of inflation (especially the changes of 
relative prices and wrong signals at allocation of resources). Besides, 
only restrictive policy makes indispensable pressure to enterprises 
to restructure. Namely if, untransformed (what means state-owned) 
enterprises go on getting "cheap" loans (which nota bene enterprises 
already can't return), and if they feed with them their present condition 
(for instance payment  of  wages without sufficient means), no changes 
in economy will definitely happen. The Croatian economy was 
developing in socialist environment (self-managing but still socialist) for 
45 years. Capacities were mostly planned for former Yugoslav market 
and less for exports. The biggest part of exports was directed to now 
non-existing COMECON. Such economic structure surely has no 
chances in  a  competitive environment. The objective of creating a 
small, open country which is able to export the biggest part of its 
production can  be realized only by restructuring. Besides, the 
economic growth based on the present structure would not 
represent any wanted qualitative change. Monetary expansion would 
first accelerate inflation  and  may  partly bring to economic growth, but 
to the growth of present economic structure what should be termed as 
unacceptable. 
 
A fact that the effects of monetary policy to economic growth are 
asymmetric shouldn't  be forgotten (see Morgan, 1993). That means 
that  monetary   policy  is   much  more  effective  when  its  restriction  is 
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aimed to curb inflation tendencies in economy (what as the part of 
heterodox program showed with us). Its effects are markedly less 
effective when we try to accelerate economic growth (respectively 
decrease of economic decline) by its expansion. The examples are 
numerous, but recent literature very often mentions the so called 
"Geraschenko effect", after the Governor of the Russian central bank. 
Namely, Russian  central monetary authority tried by monetary 
expansion (tripling of M2 during four months) to solve the problem of 
outstanding debts  of  enterprises  and economic stagnation. The result 
is  also  known:  monthly  inflation growth of under 10% to over 25% 
(see: The Economist, December 11, 1993). And production didn't 
increase. The additional liquidity generated by "printing of money" can't 
achieve permanent economic growth. 
 
 
2. The concept and measurement of liquidity  
    and the sources of illiquidity 
 
2.1. THE CONCEPT OF LIQUIDITY 
 
At the beginning, it  is  necessary  to answer the question why the 
liquidity is interesting for central monetary authority? According to the 
Law of the National Bank of Croatia (article 2): "The National Bank of 
Croatia is responsible for currency stability and for general liquidity of 
payment in the country and abroad". Consequently, care is legitimate, 
but currency stability (respectively inflation) also has to be in the 
permanent focus of interest. 
 
Liquidity is  without doubt a very complex, multidimensional 
phenomenon. As the concept of liquidity has a very wide usage, it is 
often imprecisely defined. Here are some possible definitions without 
intention of giving the definite answers: "On the level of national 
economy, liquidity denotes proportional exchange of commodity and 
money flows, respectively undisturbed development of the process of 
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production, exchange and consumption (Dictionary of banking and 
finance, 1993).  Definition  is  convenient  but  inapplicable,  namely  it  is 
difficult to  quantify  what  is the "proportional exchange of commodity 
and money flows". That is especially difficult in the conditions of 
structural lack of coordination and big institutional changes of legal 
framework which take place in Croatian economy. From the micro 
aspect, the concept of liquidity has been often used in the sense of: 
"possibilities of debt repayment  on  time and in full amount" (Dictionary 
of banking, 1992). The liquidity of funds usually includes implicitly the 
time necessary  to  transform those funds into cash or repayment of 
some debt. Consequently, liquid funds are those which can quickly, 
simply and "cheaply"  pay  obligations.  Liquidity  of  economic  subjects 
is usually measured by different proportions of liquidity what makes the 
proportion  of  liquidity  funds and different obligations. From the aspect 
of central monetary authority the liquidity of banking is of primary 
interest. 
 
Micro-liquidity can be measured relatively easily. What is the possibility 
of measuring the liquidity in the economy, respectively in the banking 
system? It seems that there is no global indicator of system liquidity. 
Therefore, it is necessary to use some proxy variables and infer about 
global liquidity. The possible indicators of liquidity in the economy are: 
changes of interest rates, changes of exchange rate and usage of 
secondary sources of liquidity by banks. In fact, all three indicators are 
directed to measurement of scarcity of money in the economy. 
 
 
2.2. MEASUREMENT OF THE GLOBAL LIQUIDITY 
 
a) The changes of interest rates on the market. The argument for 
observation of the price of money as the indicator of liquidity is 
understandable. Higher price  (and  if  there is a tendency of its 
increase), indicates  that  there  is excess demand on the market. Thus, 
if there is an increase of interest rates on the money market this would 
indicate tight liquidity and restrictive monetary policy. 
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In Croatia, there are big constraints in interpretation of interest rates  
changes    as    signals   of   the   scarcity   of   money.   First,   after   the 
implementation  of  antiinflationary measures the administrative 
restriction of interest rates was introduced by the government3. As a 
result, banks subsequently lowered their interest rates to comply with 
new regulations. Therefore, it is  very  difficult to conclude what was 
really happening with interest rates on the market. Besides, the money 
market (not only the Money market - Zagreb, but also all other buyings 
and sellings of money in the economy) is  not transparent; it is 
segmented and it is difficult to collect systemic information about it, to 
say nothing of analyzing it. Therefore, market failures on the money 
market surely exist (at  least  informational ones). That  primarily  refers 
to asymmetry of information. This is not surprising, when we have in 
mind that financial markets are underdeveloped. 
 
Anecdotal information  collected by unscientific chastener method 
(private phone calls) suggest the change of monthly rates in January 
1994 in  the  range  of 7% (usually  according to pattern: discount rate + 
5 percents of interest + 1 percent of fee) to incredible 20% of monthly 
interest rates to short-term loans. At yearly average those are interest 
rates of 100% and even to 800%. In the conditions of zero inflation in 
December, those are also the real interest rates. But it could be 
carefully suspected that positive interest rates were at the monthly level 
in the range of 6% to 10%. We shouldn't forget that the biggest part of 
the economy is still state-owned (or state controlled) and that the "soft 
budget constraints" exist. Interest  rates of 30% monthly  are  not too 
high to "drowning persons", because they neither intend nor can return 
them. 
 
After the abolition of  administrative  restrictions  on interest rates 
(interest taxation) in December 1993, no increase in interest rates was 
observed. It suggests that the problems of imbalances on the money 
market (if existent) are not huge. It is true  that  interest rates in real 
terms (and especially calculated at the yearly level) are very high. But 
attention  should  be  paid  to the fact  that high real interest rates were 
                                                          
3 A progressive tax on "excess" interest rates was introduced. 
 44
noticed in almost all countries after fast disinflation. For instance in 
Israel,  after implementation of stabilization program, the real interest 
rate figured out for some time even about 170% (see Bruno, 1993). 
Consequently, that is a regularity by which money market has been 
balanced after monetary restriction, that is after the restriction of supply 
of money and high increase of money demand (what will be discussed 
later). 
 
Of course, the questions of how high and for how long should interest 
rates be so high in real expression, are still open. The best remedy is 
surely transparent clearing money market. Very high real interest rates 
are not without negative consequences in the economy. First, negative 
influence of high interest rates to investments is known. It should be 
mentioned here that the influence of interest rates to investment in 
Croatia is very  controversial  at  this moment. Namely, the investments 
in Croatia have been decreasing (falling share in social product) 
constantly since 1979. Social product has been halved. In spite of real 
negative  interest  rates, investments were decreasing (see Bajsar, 
1993). Why then should we believe that low interest rates (created by 
monetary expansion) can revive investment activity? 
 
On the other hand, the attention should be paid to high cost input of 
interest rates. But, if the price is a measure of scarcity of money , good 
economizing with such expensive good as money is, may be expected. 
 
What is the behavior of the National bank in the conditions of 
disinflation? By its interest rate policy, central monetary authority 
intended to follow goals of economic policy. It  could  be even said that 
by decreasing of the monthly discount rate in October to 21 % (from 
28.5% in September) it even anticipated antiinflationary measures. The 
present basic interest rate (usually called discount rate which is not 
precise because  nothing is  being  discounted) in  December  1993 of 
1.1 % on a monthly basis (which means 14% yearly) is  very moderate. 
At this interest rate, the central monetary authority gives the loans to 
banks (within the refinancing facility)  and  to the central government. 
The liquidity  window  for  banks is  just  somewhat  more  expensive (the 
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interest rate is 1.45% monthly or 19% yearly). For permitted usage of 
reserve requirement up to 10% of its amount banks pay to central bank 
the monthly interest of 3.6%. All  those rates are positive in real terms 
but in comparison with mentioned market rates they are low. 
 
It is true that the penalty interest rates of monetary authorities are very 
high. Such a policy is  completely legitimate. Those rates must stay 
high in real terms because that is the only possibility of improving 
financial discipline in the economy. The  response to low interest 
rates would be a significant increase in  the  so called "secondary 
sources of liquidity" (meaning excessive use of all liquidity window at 
banks' disposal) which is a  tantamount to additional increase of 
monetary base. 
 
Let us conclude that high interest rates at this moment are a signal on 
the degree of monetary policy restriction. This is essential for the 
success of the program and high real interest rates should not be 
considered as something unusual nor exaggerated. In  the  long run, 
such real interest rates would surely have negative effect on the 
economy. It shouldn't be forgotten that we are in early phases of 
disinflation, and there are still big disturbances in the  market which 
would need some time to calm down. 
 
b) Liquidity of the banking system. Liquidity of  banks has been 
usually measured by the level of  gyro  accounts of  banks  and their 
vault cash. Those amounts have been  varying  on  a daily basis, which 
is normal. In their daily liquidity management, if they run out of money, 
banks should look at the money market. Our "official" inter-bank money 
.market is rather undeveloped and its main activity has been really 
reduced to coordination of automatism of  overnight  loans (see figure 
No. 2). Daily activity is quantitatively unimportant. But  when  the 
shortage of inter-bank funds (with or without intervention of money 
market) appears, there is also the lender of the  last  resort - The 




Let us  not  forget  that commercial banks at the end of January 1994 
and further on, could use up to 120 billions dinars of refinancing facility 
within the so called general quota. Regarding the changes of interest 
rates at the market and the level of the discount  rate (which in 
December was positive in real terms but was under the market level) 
refinancing quota was an additional (cheap) source of liquidity for the 
banking system. 
 
The use of secondary liquidity sources may be the measure of money 
demand surplus. The usage of regular loan for liquidity and of reserve 
requirement up to 10%  should be considered as regular liquidity 
window. It should be repeated that it is a question of relatively cheap 
additional liquidity. Using the regular loan for liquidity, is subject to 
sanctions and restrictions concerning the time of usage (till ten working 
days in a month), as  well  as  the necessity of existence of 
corresponding "collateral " in the form  of NBC  bills. In  such  a  way, the 
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total amount of those loans has been (fortunately) quantitatively limited. 
 
Unfortunately, the  use  of  reserve requirement is out of control of 
central monetary authority. The idea  of "the  permission of use of 
reserve requirement funds up to 10% has only ex post price 
discrimination. Otherwise it is a self-service for banks. Comparison with 
self-service is appropriate, because here the price is paid at exit, and 
rather significant thefts are also possible. 
 
Expensive funds of the central bank are the so called irregular  sources 
of additional liquidity and these are: the use  of  reserve  requirement 
over permitted 10% (what has been in latest decisions  restricted to 
totally 50% of total reserve requirement), the use of the  so  called 
special loan from primary issue, and the so called negative balance on 
the gyro accounts. 
 
A special loan (the so called special loan on the basis of guarantee on 
savings deposits and current  accounts  of households) is  a  special 
story indeed. Namely, although based on former guarantee for savings 
deposits and current accounts of  households (which  nota  bene 
explicitly doesn't exist any more, and there is still no deposit insurance 
scheme) it has been still present in the  system. From  one  side, it 
serves to banks to withdraw cash from the  Payment  System Office 
when they don't have coverage for cash withdrawals on their accounts. 
For that part, the central bank (its liquidity commission) gives daily 
permissions to banks, so they can use that loan. But a part of that loan 
can bee used autonomously. In other words, if households deposits 
decrease (on the basis of cash payments through post offices or other 
banks, or on the basis of spent cheque appear) and a bank has a 
shortage of its own funds, a bank de facto automatically  uses that loan 
in the Payment System Office without regard whether and for which 
amount it has the permission from the National Bank of Croatia. 
 
Negative balances on gyro accounts  is  an  additional idiosyncrasy of 
our payment system, on which our central monetary authority has very 
little influence. It is indented that the use of  negative balance  should  be 
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prevented by high price  of this "liquidity window" but those penalties 
have almost  no influence  on the banks that are using this "facility". It 
has to be pointed out that within our payment system banks can't 
completely control the outflows from their accounts. Therefore liquidity 
management is very difficult. 
 
The use of those sources is increase in monetary base per se, which 
means additional creation of money in the system. Thus, the use of 
secondary sources is a possible measure of excess demand for 
monetary base, namely the measurement of illiquidity. It is true that 
banks , after the implementation of the program, were using more 
secondary sources on average than earlier. Thus in September 1993, 
banks used on average 48 billions HRD, in October that amount 
increased to 207 billions HRD, in November 199 billions and in 
December to 154 billions HRD. In the first twenty five days of January 
the use was also very high, namely about 220 billions HRD on average. 
Therefore, "the October shock " forced  banks  to  use secondary 
sources of liquidity to a high extent, but that amount decreased in 
November and December. 
 
The use of secondary  sources is very unequally disposed through 
banks. There is a very clear polarization of banks in Croatia. Thus 
from complete amount of the use of reserve requirement funds (after 
overnight interventions of money market) about 90% is used by three 
banks only. The use of special loan from primary issue for payment of 
savings deposits and current accounts of citizens on  an  average is 
used in the amount of about forty billions, but that loan is almost 
exclusively used by two banks. The same is true with the use of assets 
available through gyro accounts. According to central  monetary 
authority, debts of banks can be an additional indicator of liquidity of 
banks. In December 1993 and January 1994 those debts have a 
tendency of increase. But debts are also concentrated in some banks. 
 
Concisely speaking, data on liquidity of the banking system would be 
incomparably better if "ill banks" were rehabilitated.  Namely,  to  keep 
the liquidity of the whole  system  by  monetary  policy in such a way that 
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"ill" banks can de facto use a series of sources without control, means 
only one thing - a very fast return of inflation. Consequently, under the 
condition of rehabilitation of banks, data on liquidity of the banking 
system would be much nicer. 
 
c) Exchange rate. After the introduction of  antiinflationary  program, 
and implementation of the Foreign exchange law there was a strong 
appreciation of the exchange rate of Croatian Dinar. But figure No. 1 
clearly suggests that recently after initial strong appreciation, a slight 
depreciation has been noticed. If we observe foreign exchange market 
as the whole of foreign exchange supply and  demand (where that 
market should be observed as complementary to money market in 
domestic currency) it is possible to explain appreciation as the excess 
supply of foreign exchange. Alternatively, appreciation may  mean 
excess demand of domestic currency. The conclusion could  be: the 
more the rate appreciates , the  higher  the  restriction of monetary 
policy. 
 
But the introduction of the Foreign exchange law brought very big 
structural changes to foreign exchange  market. The floating  of  the 
dinar and convertibility of current account of balance of payments, the 
permission of keeping foreign exchange accounts for enterprises, are 
only some of important changes in the foreign exchange system which 
mean huge structural changes on that market. 
 
Let us repeat that the exchange rate is now freely determined on the 
market, and central monetary authority only intervenes on this market. 
However, the scope of those interventions is restricted. On the other 
hand foreign exchange market is very "young" and therefore a certain 
period of time is necessary for the sake of running-in. As the exchange 
rate in our economy surely has a very strong signalling effect, the 
increase of the exchange rate wouldn't be interpreted as autonomous 
decrease of foreign exchange supply, but  as  the revival of inflation. 




It may be concluded that the implementation of antiinflationary program 
brought to: the increase in  real interest  rates, the  decrease of liquidity 
of banks and to appreciation of Croatian dinar. But, on the other hand 
clear polarization of banks has appeared,  so  that  the liquidity of 
banking system, with the exception of "ill banks" is much  better. All 
these are normal consequences of very fast disinflation and it is 
disproportional to speak of "extremely disturbing trends". On the 
contrary, it could be affirmed that without "decreasing" liquidity, it is 
possible neither to reduce inflation  nor to keep it  at  low  level, 
especially in initial phases of such a program. 
 
 
2.3. SOURCES OF THE LACK OF LIQUIDITY 
 
Let us consider what  are  the  possible  causes of the "lack of liquidity" 
of the global banking system. There are many of them, but the main 
ones seem to be: disinflation, non-servicing of public  debt and 
ineffective enterprises, that is "the soft budget constraints". 
 
a) Disinflation and remonetization of economy. Figure No. 3 clearly 
points out that there with inflation velocity of money increases 
dramatically.4 Figure No. 4 shows how real  money  balances (currency 
in circulation and other aggregates) have been decreasing with the 
increase of inflation. With disinflation the inverse process is going on. 
Velocity of money has been slowing down. Money demand is rapidly 
increasing and the economic subjects  want  again  to  keep more 
money, not only because of transactional motives, but as a form of 
property as well. Therefore, the remonetization of the economy is 
something that is the expected consequence. But it  should be known 
that the process of remonetization  must  go  on  gradually (for instance 
in Israel it lasted 3 - 4 years) and carefully. Fast monetary expansion 
would only "blow up" the existing structure of the economy and revive 
inflation. 
 
                                                          
4 There  are  several  papers   published  in ”Privredna   kretanja   i   ekonomska 
politika”  about velocity of money. 
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A thesis about "monetary policy  being  too  restrictive" is worth 
explaining in more details. A "mourning" that basic economic problem 
lies in the central bank because it doesn't want to buy all the offered 
foreign exchange (on the foreign exchange market), has been often 
heard. It surely isn't easy to measure the degree of restriction of 
monetary policy. The relation of money supply and demand should be 
taken into account. But, while the money supply (at least part of the 
money supply shown in monetary statistics) may  be measured, there 
are big problems connected with measurement of money demand. 
 
Firstly, it should be pointed out that people demand real money 
balances, thus they compare money with its purchasing power. 
According to widespread belief there are three reasons  why  people 
want to keep money. These are: a) transactional motifs b) motifs of 
cautiousness and c) speculative motifs. The most frequently mentioned 
variables which have impact on  money  demand are: income and 
interest rate. The income primarily influences the transactional money 
demand, and the level of interest rate measures de facto opportunity 
costs of keeping money. Higher income means higher transactional 
demand, and higher interest rates mean lower speculative money 
demand. 
 
Restriction of monetary policy may be conceived by comparison of 
money supply with some proxy-variable for money transactions5 The 
amount of total final demand (source of data "Privredna kretanja i 
ekonomska politika", No. 25, 1993.)  has  been used as a "proxy-
variable" of total money transactions. In analysis of money demand the 
velocity is an useful indicator. If final  demand (in every month) is 
divided with money supply, we will get the  so  called  turnover 
coefficient, namely the velocity of money supply. The velocity of money 
is significantly under the influence (inter alia) of inflation. With the 
increase of inflation, the  opportunity  cost  of  keeping  money increases. 
                                                          
5 Unfortunately,  the   existing  statistical  sources  don't  give  prompt  data  on 
money transactions in the economy. 
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In inflation, keeping currency means a big loss, so that everyone wants 
to get rid of it as soon as possible. The result is generally known. A big 
increase in velocity. In the time of the highest inflation, velocity (at 
monthly level) decreased to about 70% of the final consumption value. 
Compared to the data for end December 1991 (when monetary 
independence of Croatia was introduced) the velocity has tripled. The 
inverse process has been going on in fast disinflation. 
 
From figure No. 3, it can be seen that velocity has been slowing down 
and that central monetary authority  has  adapted to new 
conditions, that is to fast disinflation. This can be confirmed by data. 
Thus in December money supply was increasing at a monthly rate of 
22.4%. With zero inflation (to be more precise with monthly deflation of 
0.5%) this rate is at the same time the growth rate of real balances. Till 
November, with inflation of only 1.4% monthly, money supply increased 
(cumulatively) by 49%. Retail prices increased for 0.9%. Thus, the 
growth in real terms of money  supply  of 48%  has  been achieved. 
If we observe the last three months, the prices  cumulatively increased 
by 40%, and money supply by 93%. Thus, in three stabilization 
months money supply increased in real terms  by 38% (measured 
by deflation). 
 
The frequently emphasized cause of the lack of liquidity  for  money is 
the increase of demand for currency caused  by disinflation. A very 
strong increase of currency in circulation has influenced the liquidity of 
banks. The demand for currency is always satisfied. Therefore, the 
amount of cash in circulation is an exogenous variable for the central 
bank, because it hasn't got the possibility to control this demand. The 
increase of demand for cash means the worsening of liquidity of the 
banking system as a whole. That is especially true for some banks. 
Central monetary authority has mostly compensated the outflow of 
liquidity of banks by interventions on foreign  exchange  market, that is 
by buying foreign exchange from banks and thus creating additional 
amounts of domestic currency. 
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The currency in circulation in three stabilization months (data from the 
end of December compared to those from the end of September) 
increased by 782 billion HRD. Money  supply  increased  by 1885,9 
billion HRD, and monetary base by 957,2 billions HRD. Thus, the 
increase of monetary base is markedly bigger than the increase of 
currency in circulation. This means that central  bank  compensated 
the decrease of liquidity induced by the increase in currency in 
circulation. That enabled banks to perform indispensable changes in 
the structure of their portfolios. 
 
It seems that increase in the demand for currency in  circulation has 
been generated by  some  other factors as well. Namely, in the 
conditions of very high inflation it is a rule that a part of transactions, 
especially in the grey economy, takes place in foreign currency. In the 
Croatian case the foreign currency are German marks. There are 
indications that in the grey economy the inverse process of currency 
substitution has been taking place and that Croatian  dinar is pressing 
out German marks. Since there are no available data about the 
unregistered  economy  (by definition),  this statement can't be 
confirmed. 
 
b) Irregular  and  incomplete  payment of  public  debt  by  state and 
fiscal deficit. Over 50% of total assets of Croatian banks consist of 
claims  on the  government  based  on the public  debt. If  we  know that 
it is a long-term "investments" of banks, a very little mobility of their 
assets is evident. If a state doesn't service that part  of  banks' assets 
(the state hasn't been paying a full amount of interest , but only its 
smaller part), and if we have in mind that part of the remaining 50% of 
assets should be classified as "nonperforming loans", it is obvious how 
banks can't pay their obligations without  having  their  liquidity  very 
often imperilled. Nonservicing of public debt has surely very big impact 
for liquidity of banks. 
 
In consideration of the role of the state (that is first and foremost the 
central budget) to liquidity, it must be mentioned how budgetary funds 
are  included  in  the  banking system.  According  to  established  criteria 
 55
those deposits have been included in commercial banks. Thus, the 
variation of budgetary  funds  has been directly manifested as variation 
of liquidity of banks . Bigger outflows (for instance payment of wages 
from the budget) result in the  lack  of  liquidity  of (some)  banks. There 
is a usual practice in the world that budgetary deposits are held in the 
central bank. Pulling out the deposits from the  banking  system is 
neither simple nor unambiguous action, but it surely deserves careful 
consideration in regard to its influence to liquidity. 
 
c) Nonefficient enterprises. In the conditions of high inflation, many 
enterprises could live easily. The high price growth covered all losses, 
growth of costs and nonefficient management. In the  conditions  of 
stable prices the situation has dramatically changed. If loss-making 
enterprises don't restructure, they will surely  accumulate losses, 
meaning that their debt either towards banks or towards other 
enterprises will increase. If the number of those enterprises is relatively 
big, it is possible to calm down their "demand" for money only by 
extremely expensive monetary policy. Such enterprises often raise 
interest rates on the market ("every credit is welcomed regardless of its 
price"), what has consequences on the entire economic system. 
 
It may be said concisely that some sources of lack of liquidity are the 
regular occurrence of the situation in which we are situated (disinflation 
and slowing down the velocity of circulation).  But  the  others 
(enterprises which still operate with losses and budgetary deficit) 
demand systemic and steady work in order to alleviate them. 
 
 
3. Monetary policy and its constraints 
 
We can say that disinflation has pointed out that there are four basic 
"constraints" of efficient monetary policy. These are: "ill banks" and the 
existing payment system, central budget,  and "shallow financial 
markets" and poverty of monetary policy instruments. 
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a) "ill banks" are  the  main  obstacle  of further conducting restrictions 
in monetary policy. Due to existing payment system (as it has been 
already described), monetary authority has been losing control over 
monetary base changes. The urgent implementation of announced 
financial rehabilitation of banks is indispensable presumption of the 
stabilization program. The overthrow of high inflation is only the 
necessary condition (prerequisite) for restructuring of the economy and 
the basis for revival of production and renewal of the country. The fast 
growth of the economy is not possible  without a  healthy  banking 
system in Croatia. One  cannot  speak  about the healthy banking 
system with maintenance of the existing structure of banks customers 
(meaning the structure of the economy). 
 
In the conditions of present payment system it should be admitted that 
the possibilities of the National Bank of Croatia to prevent such 
movements are very limited. Financially non-improved banking system 
and the inclusion  of "ill banks" into  additional  sources  of liquidity 
appear as the serious barrier for efficient monetary policy. Thus, those 
problems should be emphasized as primordial and their solution an 
indispensable prerequisite of the realization of monetary policy projection 
(and consequently broader objectives of economic policy) during the 
whole 1994. Banks debts towards monetary authority are an issue per 
se. This debt brings into danger the possibility of efficient control of 
monetary aggregates. 
 
b) For successful implementation of stabilization, fiscal restriction is 
necessary. There is not enough reliable data that we could indisputably 
confirm that public sector deficit hasn't been financed through primary 
issue. It is true that direct credit financing of central budget has been 
carefully registered. But there are  also  outstanding  manners  and that 
is that banks through the payment system can sometimes create "the 
money on their own" and that has been caused by non-servicing of 
public debt and by the arrears of central budget towards enterprises. 
Without clearly quantified sources of financing the budgetary deficit and 
all  expenditures  clearly  defined ,  the  quasi-fiscal  function   of   central 
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monetary authority (not wanted and verbally condemned)  will go on. 
That is especially dangerous if central bank  and  central  budget 
relations remain insufficiently transparent. The best decision made on 
the basis of wrong premises may have dangerous effects for the 
economy. Consequently, fiscal sphere may become a deterrent to 
effective monetary policy. Transparency of relations with state, that is 
with budget, should be pointed out as strategically significant goal of 
monetary authority. The existing  system  of interacting  debt and 
demand "clearance" disturbs  the  so  called "gross principle" in 
budgetary  formation. That  should  be  further  considered as 
inadequate, because it doesn't show  quasi-fiscal  functions  which 
central monetary authority has been still performing for the central 
budget. 
 
c) "Shallow financial markets" and poverty of monetary policy 
instruments. In Croatia the banks are still the main intermediator 
between the sectors with financial surplus and those  with financial 
deficit. The number of products  which  banks  offer  to their clients is 
very poor. The activity of banks has been mostly  restricted to basic 
credit and deposit activity. Households can only choose between time 
deposits in local currency and buying foreign currency, with timid 
appearance of shares  in  portfolio  of  households.  Underdevelopment 
of the Money and short-term securities market, and the Zagreb stock 
exchange (as well as the other securities market) along with the non-
existence of adequate legal framework,  are big obstacles to 
development of financial intermediation. Weak intermediation also 
means less liquidity, respectively less elasticity to shocks because the 
possibilities of alternative financing are limited. 
 
 
4. Strategy for further development and possible measures 
 
According to available data and  previous discussion it may be 
concluded that the liquidity of the economic system has somewhat 
worsened with the implementation of the antiinflationary measures. 
Secondary  sources of liquidity (lender-of-last-resort facilities) have been 
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used to a greater extent than earlier. In the meantime, significant 
qualitative changes have happened in the financial sphere. Inflation has 
decreased to very low or negative single-digit numbers (monthly rates). 
The behavior of all subjects has essentially changed in new 
circumstances. Central  monetary  authority  intended (and still intends) 
to conduct a policy of "light" restriction with careful eavesdropping of 
economic trends. But in disinflation, there are some other essential 
changes (primarily the slowing down of velocity of money, respectively 
demand for real money balances has been increasing). With the 
exception of October 1993, when monetary restriction was very strong 
(what is regularly the part of  such  antiinflationary  programs - cold 
turkey strategy - , so it can be considered  lege artis) the  end  of the 
year can be qualified as small restriction. 
 
Therefore causes of the "lack of" liquidity should be primarily looked for 
in unsolved structural problems of our economy. Very high inflation has 
successfully fogged them. In present conditions they have become 
visible. At the end, a list of proposals consisting of measures is given. 
 
1. III banks should be strictly controlled and their automatic use of 
secondary sources of liquidity  should  be  restricted. Those banks 
should not transfer to their regular activity unless they have been 
financially rehabilitated. In the short history of  monetary independence 
of Croatia recapitalization of the banking system  has  been  done 
already twice (big bonds and "frozen foreign exchange savings 
accounts"). Nowadays, those recapitalization schemes represent a big 
part of internal public debt. Consequently, the following recapitalization 
(of some, not all banks) should be the last one,  otherwise  the problem 
of moral hazard would remain to be persistent in banks' management 
behavior. 
 
2. Banking  supervision (of all banks in Croatia)  should  be  much 
stricter. That especially refers to ex ante activity and prevention of future 
possible  damages.  It  is  impossible  to  avoid  contaminated  assets, 
but they could be minimized by adequate prudential control of banks 
(more than 50%  of  banks  are  still  state  controlled).  Furthermore, one 
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should insist on financial discipline of all banks. In that context, we 
should  reconsider  the present payment system very carefully, 
especially the use of  reserve requirement and negative balances on 
gyro accounts. 
 
All financial experts are aware of the fact that bankruptcy of banks is 
extremely expensive and therefore it is very rarely applied. At bigger 
banks it is practically impracticable ("Too big to fail") . But as the 
philosophy  of  the  market is in its  essence the philosophy of failure 
(that is permanent fear of  possible bankruptcy), it is  necessary  to  act 
in such a way that the management of banks wouldn't exploit that 
comprehension. The price of financial rehabilitation of banks, in ultima 
linea, has been always  paid by taxpayers through direct taxes or 
through inflationary tax. Therefore, it is further necessary to develop 
mechanisms which will prevent the appearance of moral hazard in the 
behavior of administration of banks. It seems that after the above 
mentioned rehabilitation such behavior is quite present. 
 
3. To work on the elimination of the still existing political influence on 
decision-making process in banks (that is  the  allocation of credit).That 
is connected with the  process  of  privatization in the economy and in 
the banking system which should be accelerated as soon as possible. 
 
4. The state should service regularly its public debt. Besides, the state 
must decrease its outstanding debt, both  towards banks and 
enterprises. By its size and outstanding debts in payments, central 
budget influences the liquidity of the whole economy. The  present way 
of inclusion of budgetary funds into the banking system has a strong 
impact to big oscillations in liquidity. That should be changed in the 
foreseeable future. By regular payment of its obligations the state 
strengthens the confidence in its financial discipline. And  that is 
essential if the Ministry of finance wants to finance a  part  of its  deficit 
by short-term securities. At the same time that would more actively 
develop financial markets in Croatia. 
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5. The state has to initiate and carry out the process of restructuring of 
the biggest loss-making enterprises. Enterprises without chance to 
survive in market conditions (and it is usually known which enterprises 
are in question) should be restructured. Such as they are , they 
represent "the hole without bottom" in which liquidity outflows 
(accumulation of debts) without hope for recovery. 
 
6. Very active relation towards further expansion and deepening of 
financial markets in Croatia is necessary. It is necessary to create 
additional securities and to accelerate their circulation. That would 
influence the increase of liquidity of the  whole  economic  system. If 
there is a strategic aim to develop indirect control of monetary 
aggregates, it is indispensable to develop operations on the open 
market. As the choice of securities very poor at this moment, the 
National Bank of Croatia must actively develop its NBC bills market. 
Besides, the more active role of the monetary authority on interbank 
money market is needed. Past  changes in  monetary  policy  are surely 
a step in the right direction,  but the  existing instruments still don't 
enable the conducting of monetary policy in a way as it has been going 
on  in   developed   market   economies.  The   changes  are  not 
possible overnight, but the systemic and persistent work on that is 
necessary. 
 
7. To watch carefully the movement of cash and liquidity of banks and 
consequently to  conduct  flexible (but restrictive)  monetary  policy and 
to adjust its objectives accordingly to  changes in  the  economy. Such 
an approach is necessary, because the process of  disinflation is very 
fast and markets are "nervous", changes  are  quick,  and  bigger  shifts 
in  behavior  of subjects are possible as well. Completely new 
institutional framework also demand time in order to accommodate to 
"the rules of game". Consequently, flexible and reasonable observation 
of situation with permanent caution on the recurrence of inflation is 
needed. 
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8. To influence actively the improvement  of existing instruments of 
banks borrowing from central bank (refinancing, discount and liquidity 
windows). Liquidity variations are normal appearance in banks. In our 
conditions, refinancing window should be closed. Central monetary 
authority must not stimulate banks to use liquidity window too often. 
Therefore, interest rate on those loans should be higher than interbank 
money market rates. Finally, this window must  be open only in 
necessity, and the conditions of its use must be very rigorous. 
 
9. To strengthen financial discipline of enterprises. That  can  be made 
by adequate control (punishment of non payers), effective legal system 
(acceleration of bankruptcy process), restructuring of enterprises and 
creating of such legal framework which will markedly  decrease 
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